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THE TORCH COMMANDO & THE POLITICS OF WHITS OPPOSITION
SOUTH AFIUCA 1951 - 1953
By Michael Fr idjhon. .
The Torch Commando i s customari ly regarded as a
war ve te rans 1 movement which emerged spontaneously as a
response to the proposed v io l a t i on of the Cons t i tu t ion by
the N a t i o n a l i s t Government through the removal of the
Coloureas irora cne Common Roll without the r e q u i s i t e two
thirds majority. *
In terras of this view, the emotional and volatile
nature of the movement's origins are both i ts strength and i ts
weakness. The Torch is regarded as an ephemeral feature
on the South African political landscape. The explanation
of its meteoric rise and fall needs to be consistent for itself
only, and only bears relation to the rest of the white
political structure inasmuch as i t can be used to elucidate
problems about the official opposition groups.
There is no definitive published source on the
Torch Commando. On the contrary, the most remarkable feature
about the bibliographical material on the war veterans •-
movement is its paucity. There ere several published accounts
on the period but only four of them allocate more than a
page or two to the movement. Were it net so far-fetched an idea,
one might almost conclude that a conspiracy of silence
sheathes the Torch's history. Ten years after the movement's
collapse, the obituaries of 'Sailor1 Malan - who had
been National President of the Torch - all failed to mention
his involvement in the organisation at a i l .
The failure to investigate the Torch's history
with any real penetration has been largely responsible for
the failure to attribute Co i t its more profound place
in terms of the politics of the white political spectrum.
Political analysts of the period have been happy to accept
the canned accounts of the movement's activit ies. Controversial
areas are blithely glossed over, and the overall "Impression
left with one is of an opposition which was unitad^ia its;.. ^
impotence. In fact, throughout its brief but turbulent career,
the Torch touched on alternatives which i t failed to utilise
for reasons more deep-seated than most glib analyses can explain.
Central to sn understanding of the Torch's political
role is an investigation into the controversy of the movement's
origins. The inception of the War Veterans1 Action Committee
heralded a propaganda campaign"Trom tha movement's opponents
which only died down scne time after the Torch's demise. J.G.Strydom
and Or Karl Eremer, both ministers in the Nationalist
government, ahacst immediately accused tha Torea or~~rotalitarian
^nclinationsC-VMol'e explicitly, PrJ.me Minister Malan allegedi ts aescenc from the Springbok Legion.
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Ballinger, M, Vron Union to|Apartheid 1969 p. 272
2. Carter, G.M. op. cl t . passim
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Naturally enough, the ex-servicemen repudiated these
allegations. Since most of the Nationalist's claims were
patently far-fetched and contradictory tha possibility
that there could have been a connection between the Torch
and the Springbok Legion was swiftly glossed over-
There was, ot course,.reason to deny the tie- up.
The Springbok Legion had doubtful enough origins as a kind
of soldiers• trade union, and many of its office-bearers
were of dubious political connections. Nevertheless, it had
in its time been a fairly acceptable body, operating g
with the blessing of several of the United Party's Ministers.
The period immediately prior to the LS£8 elections
began the decline of the Legion's fortunes. Firstly, it
quarrelled with the othar ex-servicemen's organisations o
on the question of how actively to approach the 1948 election;
secondly, with demobilisation proceeding relatively smoothly
by 1948, it had lost much of its raison d'-etre.
This decline promoted a divergence between the Legion's
officers and their ostensible functions* A more radical
leadership emerged willing to use the shell of tha war
veterans1 organisation for precisely located political ends.
As a former employee of tha Legion put it:-'We spent our time
raising money for the Legion" and only got enough to pay our
own salaries.1
By the early 1950fs. the Springbok Legion was regarded
as distinctly disreputable. For years it had had to counter
accusations that it was simply another front for the Communist 12
Party. Its virulent opposition to the Suppression of Communism Act
must have left its detractors in little doubt.S
In truth the movements leadership was fairfurther to the
Left than its remaining members. Several of its executive
officers were subsequently banned or listed. Allegations
about its activities contained a sufficient core of substantiatable
fact.
Under these circumstances, the W?r Veterans' Action Committee -
which became the Torch Commando - did its best to eliminate
any traces of a possible connect ion between the two organisations.
Sympathetic literature has accepted these denials, commending
the motion carried by a member of the Torch executive, himself
8
 Legionnaire, to the effect that all, Springbok Legion members
-^  on the Torch executive should resign. Despite this very
K\) conscientious activity.to obliterate any signs.of a direct link
between the two organisations, there does seem to be sufficient
evidence to support Dr Malan's claims that the Torch emerged
as fi front for the activist wing of the Springbok Legion..
Just before the 1948 election, the Springbok LegiolPcalled
upon all ex-servicemen to support the United Party for fear . *
of the consequences of Nationalist victory (14) After the
elections, the Legion continued its liaison with the United
,
Farty. In the course of discussions they argued that unless
the Nationalists were forced to the polls before the 1952
delimitation, the government would entrench themselves immovably
by means of that delimitation, the inclusion of South West Africa
with disproportionate loading in the South African House of
Assembly, and the removal of the Cape Coloureds from the Common
With^Smuts1 death, the Legion/United Party liaison fell
into abeyance.However, it was reopened later in 1950, or more
6. Malan spoke of the Torch" as being communist-based, Stryciom
alleged they were the creation of the United Party. The Burger
(8th November, 1951) suggested it thrived on Jewish funds, "inister
Swart reconciled all this by pointing out that the United Party
was closely allied to the communists. (Star 24th Sepcemoer, 1951)
7. e.g. Bram Fischer and Vernon SerrangS ^Ide Rand Daily Mail 3rd May
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probably early In 1951. It was then decided to mobilise ex-
servicemen discontent on such a scale that the government would
be provoked into calling an election- The pattern of early
Torch activity corroborates this circumstantially. Certainly the
connection is alleged in interviews with several former officials
of the Legion. One specifically claimed that it was the Legion
which proposed to Vic Clapham, a full-time United Party organiser
and regular contributor to Forum, the plan which led to the
meetings of 4th May, 1951. (16)
The meeting appears to ha'&a been attended by Clapham,
Cecil Williams, who subsequently became Chairnan of the Legion
and P.J.Hodgson, the Legion's secretary. At the. time Clapham
was involved with organising the United Party protest meeting
to be held at the Johannesburg City Hall at Lunchtime on
Monday 23rd April, 1951. The Legionaires put it to Clapham
that the protest campaign against the unconstitutional removal
of the Coloureds from the Common Roll would obtain force and
vitality if the support of ex-servicemen were enlisted en masse.
In view of the doubtful political associations of most
°f the Legion's office-bearers, am\official connection between
the two organisations would have been political suicide. This
was acknowledged as much by the Lee ion as by the United Party.
Tha other ex-servicemen's organisations had already rejected
the idea of involvement in the ovartVpolitical arena. To mobilise N
ex-servicemen discontent therefore necessitated the creation
of a new ex-servicemen's organisation, ostensibly of a-political
origins. The War Veterans1 Action Committee, which subsequently
became the Torch Commando £uii:llled this requirement admirably.
Louis Kane-Berman, Ralph Parrott and'Sailor5 Malan had no
political affiliations. Maj. J.D.Pretorius was admittedly a
member of the Provincial Council, though he was arguably involved
in his capacity as a fairly senior officer. There is no evidence
to suggest that Mrs Ooreen Dunning's presence on the Committee
was due to anything other than her being former head or W.A.A.F. (18)
The ex-servicemen launched their protest by laying wreathes
on the Johannesburg Cenotaph, together with a coffin bearing
the 'constitution.1 The object of the protest was to hand over
to the war dead the Constitution for safekeeping. The inscription
on the coffin pledged the war veterans to defend the sacrifices
of their dead comrades.(19)
On the 4th May, 1951 t&Qfc'-msxa<'- meetings were held
in which some 25 000 people participated,At both meetings the
speakers spoke in terms of the right of ex-servicemen to A voice
in the affairs of che country: this attitude came to epitomise
the war veterans' grounds for overt political involvement. Political
activity was not seen by them as a party issue. Rather, it was a
crusade in the sane spirit as their opposition to Hitler in 1939.
As such, it was perceived in/moral rather than political terms. /
'Sailor' Malan summed up their position when ho said: '
Who has the greater claim to talk about saving white
civilisation? the moles who now pay lip service to it
or the men who fought for it? (20)
£. Specifically W.B.Madeley. Minister of Labour.Star _^  5th February, 1944
Harry Lawrence, Minister of Justice Ibid 4th December, 1946
General Smuts Ibid 13th September, 1957J~2Oth September, 1947. .
9. The issue of political involvement cost the Legion the resignations
of Sir George Albu and A.E.P.Robinson (Star 24th February, 1945)
Within a few months of this, tension witn che South African Legion
made even a joint coordinating committee impossible.
10.Author's interview. Interviewee unwilling to disclose identity.
11.For this and refutation vide Sunday Tinv3S 27th June 1948 ^ __
12.vide Springb&k Legion 'TOTTl wfl bfi "ftSfiOTff'for this?' Johannesburg 195
There was in this approach, however, a contradiction basic
to the r&la assumed by the Torch Commando, While attempting to
wage a moral crusade over principles, they were engaging in the
very political arena above which they believed themselves to be.
The issue of the Separate Representation of Voters Bill was for
them an ethical problem of method rather than end: they found
the abrogation of an Entrenched Clause, particularly without
a genuine two thirds majority, more offensive than the deprivation
of voting rights the Coloureds might suffer.
However the very ideology underlying this attitude was for
their political opponents just as much of a political issue.
It was quite naive to beliefs that an ex-servicemen's organisation
of the nature of the Torch would be regarded by the Nationalists
a s
 s"Pr^ political, when their very existence as war veterans
provided concrete evidence of a political chasm which had been
reopened twelve years before. (21)
Despite the unwillingness of the literature on the Torch
to examine the problem of the movement's connections with the
Springbok Legion* there seems to be little doubt that a very
definite connection existed between the two. This is confirmed,
by the events/which followed during the first few months of the
Xorch's existence. Of particular note are the activities \
leading to the 'Steel Commando' drive to Cape Town, and the
riot which followed the meeting at the Grand Parade, culminating
the drive. Once again, this has proved to be ah area in which
investigators of the movement have happily accepted the Torch's
denials of any responsibility for the unrest which usurped their
meeting and its aftermath, and once again, this repudiation was
hardly surprising at a time when the Nationalists attempted to
gain a great deal of political mileage from the lawlessness
which followed the 'constitutionalists1' gathering.
The 4th May, 1951 meeting in Johannesburg adopted four
resolutions:
1. We ex-servicemen and women and other citizens assembled here
protest in the strongest possible terms against the action
of the present Government in proposing to violate the spirit
of the Constitution.
2. We solemnly pledge ourselves to take every constitutional
step in the interests of our country to enforce an immediate
General election.
3. We call on other ex-servicemen and women, ex-service
organisations and democratic South Africans to pledge
themselves to this cause.
4. We resolve that the foregoing resolutions be forwarded
to the Prime -Minister and the leaders of the other political
parties. (2Z)
13. Carter, G.M. op. cit. p. 311
14. This had been a constant feature of Legion poLicy since 1945
when an officiaL statement (Star 26tti Sepcember, 1945) said:
' The Springbok Legion must, in the ex-servicemen's interests,
oppose Crie polIClcal rise of the anti-war group who will
betray the soldiers1 interests.1
15. Author's communication with former Legion office-bearer. Interviewee
unwilling to disclose identity.
16. Author's interview. Interviewee unwilling to disclose identity.
17. vide Forum 20th April, 1951.
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These resolutions had to be conveyed to the government. The
Torch recognised its essential strength to be its capacity to
mobilise the disillusioned whites, however divergent their political
affiliations might be. The obvious next phase of mass mobilisation
would be to exploit the situation created by the fourth resolution
to bring home to the Prime Minister the full implications of the
war veterans* stand. •'-.
On 8th May, the War Veterans1 Action Committee met, ostensibly
to consider how best to implement the decisions of 4th May (23)
A statement issued after this meeting announced that a manifesto
would be released on 13th May. The statement suggested that a
'dramatic means1 of transmitting the resolutions was to be
employed.(24)
T\\e four resolutions had been formulated by the War Veterans'
Action Committee before the demonstration of 4th May. There is
therefore no doubt that they constituted an integral part of
the Action Committee's plans - that is to 'say, the Action Committee
wanted to be in a position of having to convey the resolutions
to the Nationalists. The 'dramatic means1 of conveying the
meeting's sentiments evolved into what is known as the 'Steel Commando*
drive to Cape Town. Jeeps and vehicles from seventeen towns
O *-n C n e Uni.°n set off in convoy to meet at Somerset West on
28th May, proceeding to Cape Town that evening for what is
perhaps the largest white opposition demonstration in South African
politics.(25) It seems reasonable to assume that the War Veterans'
Action^fcommittee's planning of the 'Steel Commando1 drive
antedated the 4th May meeting in view of the fourth resolution
and the statement following the 8th May meeting. But it was
essential that the Action Committee's programme to mobilise
mass sentiment appeared-to emanate from the public. Hence the
statement that the 8th May meeting had been called to consider
the implementation of the resolutions of 4th May.
On 12th May several newspapers carried announcements of
the impending 'bteel Commando* drive. The public was informed that
the War Veterans' Action Committee had 'planned everything down
to the last detail:' (26) likewise, that 'the whole operation
has been planned with military precision.' (27)
The ex-servicemen were successfully combining a mass movement
with a cadre organisation. The quasi-military approach of their
organisation, as well as their press statements, suggests an
efficient, minority-run body, operating from committee to supporters.
However the tone and structure of their announcement conveys the
impression that the movement is working in response to mass
opinion, not attempting to mould it. As long as this ambiguity
between initiative and response was maintained, the Torch
Commando was able to convert? mass sentiment into "political momentum.
On 15th May, yet a further statement was issued:.
Reconnaissance men left Johannesburg on Monday afternoon
(14th May. 1951)/after the last committee meeting to cover
routes ana make arrangements for reception committees and
accommodation in the various big towns.(28)
J6. Details of members vide Rand Daily Mall 1st May. 1951
19. Ibid 23rd April, 19"5T;
20. IEIH 5th May, 1951
21. For details of the ideological division in the U.F./H.N.P.
split of 1939 vide Katz, E. »The circumstances surrounding
South Africa's entry into the Second World War.1 Unpublished
History Honours Dissertation. University of the Witwacersrand 1962.
22. Rand Daily Mail 5l'h May. 1951
23. Ibid. 9th May, 1951
24- Ibid.
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This release is interesting for two reasons: firstly the
statement issued on ilth Nay claimed that the War Veterans1 Action
Committee had already planned everything down to the last
detail, that the whole operation had been organised with
military precision. Yet this announcement suggests that planning
was still in the incipient stages. In other words, the War
Veterans ' propaganda method depended on their presenting their
organisation as a fait accomoli: the effect of spontaneity
ana autonomous momentum was maintained through the continual
issuing of press statements which implied that informal, but
precise organisational work followed immediately the expression .
of mass sentiment. In this way, the appearance of a mass
organisation was conveyed by a body which was in essence a cadre
unit.
The further significance of the statement is that it confirms
the claim, made in interview that the Springbok Legion played
a leading rfiie in the launching of the 'Steel Commanao. • (29)
The Legion organiser interviewed asserted that he and several
other full time Legion workers left for Cape Town shortly after
the Johannesburg ftth May meeting to arrange support and co-operation
from the towns along the route. He added that contacts in the
various centres were established by the United Party through
their liaison Vic Clapham. Subsequent daily reports on the
progress of the 'Steel Commando1 further support this: Cecil
Williams, soon to be Chairman of the.Legion, is described as -
the adjutant to the 'Steel Commando/(3O) Later denials by the /
Torch of the presence of any Legion members in positions of
seniority proceed from political expediency in the face of
the attack launched by the Nationalists and not from a scrupulous
sense of accuracy.
The gathering of the 'Steel Commando1 in Cape Town shows
the mass nature of the Torch Commando at its zenith. However,
even then, mere hours before, the . meeting on the Grand Parade,
the statements issued by the movement's leaders revealed the
ambiguities inherent in the Torch, 'gailor1 Malan announced that
the government has gone too far, that the 'Steel Commando1
•was not an armed protest, but we ... (the war veterans)... are
going to go on to the end.' (31) Dolf de la Rey, the figurehead
of the 'Steel Commando1 said that the Prime Minister was going to
be asked to resign -'if he refuses, we are going to see that
he is soundly defeated in the next election.'(32)
The nrobiem for both leaders lay in their being at the head
of an !action' - and therefore potentially revolutionary -
movement in a situation where such action could only be construed
as unconstitutional. Since the very ralson d'etre of the Torch
was the preservation of the Constitution^ the could not permit
the movement to manifest its discontent in its most logical way.
Hence 'Sailor' Malan denies the armed nature of their protest,
but asserts - inconclusively - that they are prepared Co go on to
the end. Dolf de la Rey, equally lamely, threatens the Prime Minister
with defeat if he does not resign. An interview with a former
Legion worker, and subsequent correspondence with a former office-
bearer now living abroad, suggests that the leaders were themselves
fully aware of a discrepancy between intention and act in the
mobilisation of the 'Steel Commando.*^ ' v
25. For details vide Cape Times 29th May, 1951.
26. Rand Daily MaTT~l2th Ma'yT 1951
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. 16th May 1951
29. interview with former Legion organiser. Interviewee unwilling
to disclose identity.
30. Rand Daily Mail 24th May, 1951.
31. Capg Times ZEth May, 1951
32. Ibid.
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When Che Legion/United Party Liaison had been renewed after
smuts' death, it appears a decision was taken by both parties
to mobilise ex-servicemen discontent to an extent sufficient to
provoke the government to go to the polls. It was with this idea
in mind that the original, plan for the'Steel Commando1 had been
mooted. This explains further the formulation of the resolutions
passed at the Ath May, 1951 Johannesburg meeting: the second
motion declared the War Veterans1 intention of forcing a general
election by whatever means were constitutionally possible,; the
fourth resolution opened the way for the 'Steel Commando1 drive.
Not only does this confirm the connection between.the United Party,
the Springbok Legion and the Torch, but it provokes two further
problems, neither of which has been satisfactorily examined
to date because the alliance was always denied: what went wrong
with this carefully prepared plan, and how is it that two such
divergent organisations saw fit to co-operate with each other?
The plan itself seems to have foundered as a result of the
poor co-ordination and ill-preparedness of the United Party.
The preparations were conceived some time before the enthusiastic
response to the torchlight protest in Johannesburg on 4th May. 1951.
,~ However, the overwhelming response to the 'Steel Commando1 call
:) left the United Party flat-footed. Sir de Villiers Graaff M.P.
and Harry Oppenheimer M.F. were sent to Johannesburg to
consult with the War Veterans1 Action Committee. The ex-servicemen
were told that on no account were they to call upon the
government to resign at this stage, since the United Farty
electoral machinery was in no position to. organise a General
Election. (33) /
Consequently, though the planned mass gathering in Cape Town
went ahead, the reason for such a show of strength - an attempt
to compel the government to call an election - had fallen
away. It was hardly surprising that Dolf de la Rey proposed
supporting his lame call for the Prime Minister's resignation
with the threat to trounce him in the next election. Hence too
'Sailor' Malan's non sequitur: from the moment the ex-servicemen
agreed to abandon their call to the Nationalists to resign,
the mass impact value of a group objuring party politics was lost.
From this point in time, the decline of the ex-servicemen's movement
can be traced.
From its alliance with the Legion through the Torch, no doubt
J the United farty aimed at obtaining wider popular support.
This is an insufficient explanation for wh$t. the Legion committed
itself to the alliance. Frobably the answer is to ba found in
the chaos and rioting which followed the orderly demonstration
outside parliament and on the Grand Parade.
After the meeting had been officially terminated, and the
delegation had left the Parade to deliver the resolutions to
the House, a large crowd, primarily of Coloureds surged up the
hill to Parliament, A clash with the police followed, in which
about 160 people were injured, and the railings and windows
of the Groote"Kerk were damaged. (34)
This led to an acrimonious series of exchanges in the House
the following day, polarising opinion over the Torch and its
responsibility for what took place. What actually happened was
swiftly subordinated to what either party chose to believe had
happened, so that the issue was confused by contemporaries and /
33, Author's communication. Writer unwilling to disclose identity.
34. Rand Daily Mail 30th May, 1951.
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researchers alike. However much the bitterness of the debate
was the product of a need to gain political advantage from the
event, the doubts expressed by the Nationalists as to the
constitutionality of the rioters1 intentions seem well-founded.
Louis KaneBerman admitted in an interview that many of the rank
and file at the Grand Farade had urged the leaders of the
meeting to direct a march on the Assembly to 'throw out the
Nationalists.f (35) Janet Robertson claims that John Lang,
formerly on the National Executive of the Torch Commando,
told her that Jock Isacowitz former Chairman of the Springbok Legion
had mooted a similar scheme. (36)
There is no reason to doubt the opinion expressed
by a Legion organiser that by this stage the Legion had very little
to lose on a gamble of insurrection. The initial object in
suggesting the formation of an ex-servicemen's movement to
the United Fa.rty had been to create something which would run
• away with its organisers, or would at least force the government
to go to the polls.(37) Now that the plan to force the
Rationalists resignation had been sabotaged by the United Party's
Q Xll-preparedness, there seemed only gain to be obtained throughforcing the issue. If anyone did incite the crowd, it was
certainly Torch members with Legion affiliations. This much was
certainly believed by the War Veterans' Action Committee, though
they naturally enough said nothing: almost immediately after the
event the War'Veterans took fright, and distanced themselves
from the political radicals.
After the 28th May, 1951 meeting in Cape Town, the
Torch never received quite the same euphoric support that had
characterised its earlier enterprises.*This was in part due to
a growing awareness that vast demonstrations could not, of
their own accord, bring change, and in part due to a change
in the strategy of/leadership which succeeded the Legion influence. /
This latter point is well-illustrated by the way preparations f
were undertaken for the next mass venture, the £1 Alamein Day
commemoration campaign.
The genesis of the scheme was never disguised in the same
 ]0 >
vagueness that the precdeding demonstrations were clothed in: ' °
there was no attempt to imply that the leadership was 'functioning
in response to a mass sentiment. Instead it was made clear that
the plans gelled at a meeting of the National Executive of the
Torch Commando held on 28th and 29th July, 1951. The apparently . .
mass base of the movement was slowly revealing itself to be
cadre in core and conduct.
The El Alamein Day commemoration campaign mobilised some
L50 COO people despite unfavourable weather and administrative f.
difficulties.8This was obviously not an unsatisfactory response
to the Torch's call, but it was able to offer nothing to those
who had braved the elements to attend. The bankruptcy of ideas
at the centre undermined the cadre nature of the movement
simultaneously with, and on account of. the mass sunport the
Torch had generated, feople expected that more would happen
than simply their ideas being put over 'on an unprecedented scale.' (39)
All but the Afrikaner political nation h=d been mobilised:
yet the full strength and implications of the widespread political
35. Author's interview.
36. Robertson, J. on. c i t . p. 60 Footnote 3.
37. Author's interview. Interviewee unwilling to disclose identity.
38. Full details of attendances summarised in Natal Daily News
24th October, 1951
39. ".and Daily Vail 3~th July, 1*?51; 7th August, 1051..
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discontent remained unexnloited because no one was prepared to
harness them unequivocally. The failure to offer a real plan of /
action left the Torch Commando with two equally unnalataDle/alternatives: /
it could either Ee a national circus staging meaningless spectaculars, "
or it could attemnt to chanrelthe force of its numbers
through legitimate political outlets. The only other possibility,
namely an attempt to organise some sort of an insurrection i Q >
was obviously not under consideration, once ties with the
alienated groups on the Left had been cut.
Since neither of the two alternatives was particularly
attractive, the Torch Commando tended to opt for both. The eighteen
months following the El Alamein Day commemoration.saw several
mass demonstrations organised. The Appeal Court decision
invalidating the Separate Representation of Voters Bill and
the governmenCs threats to override that decision led to widespread
protests during the early months of 1952. these were expressions
of discontent felt by all the white opposition groups in South
Africa and organised in conjunction with them. There was no
intention of radically terminating Nationalist rule. Instead,
the Torch Commando was becoming increasingly involved in the
Cjworld of structured party politics.
Until the conclusion of the pact known as the United
Democratic Front in April 1952, the Torch Commando's relations
with the opposition parties were officially characterised by
a friendly informality. Almost from the moment these relations
were formalised, they deteriorated. This was not simply a
coincidence, nor a necessary result of the structuring of thetr
mutual situations. It was a pattern which had been evolving
for some time, and which was rendered manifest by the additional
strains the pact imposed.^*
The Torch Commando had* been formed ostensibly to protest
against the proposed violation of the Constitution, and to
remove the Nationalist government from power. Ethical considerations
about the means to be employed in the fulfilment of the second
of. these'aims determined that there would be a contradiction
between the nature of the movement, and its method. Its leaders .
were aware of this, for within months of the Torch18.Inception.
'Sailor1 Malan was quoted as saying:
:J We have no intention of affiliating with the United Tarty
but since the National Party was elected to power in a
constitutional way, ve must fight them constitutionally,
and we can only do this by helping the United Farty.(40)
Cnce the Torch had abandoned the original demand - '
scheduled for 28th May, 1951 - that the government should
resign, and had renounced any unconstitutional attempt at
removing the Nationalists, their force of numbers could only
have meaning in a General Election - which would be called
at the Government's pleasure. Consequently the Torch was
driven towards the political groups which held a fixed place
in the political structure.
The United Party, for their part, commended the activities
of the Torch, defending them whenever they were called upon to
2*
40. Ibid. 27th J^ly, 1951 ~ ~ ~
41. Over the Cape Town clash: vide Assembly Debates Vol 76 Cols. 7914 et ssq
Ibid. Vol. 78 Cols. 4407 et seq.
Statements in commendation: East London Daily Dispatch 22nd August, 193.
Natal Daily News 29th Rentnmbpr, l«5i
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fatal for us to form a separate party. • (42) The co-operation
between the Torch and the United Party in the/municipal elections /
in November, 1951 in Johannesburg seemed a natural step along the *
path that both the Torch and the Opposition parties were treading. (43)
However, the t>reat risk f.or the Torch of too close a link
with the United Tarty was that i t would inherit the weakness of
the party and i t s place on the Political structure. It would also
lose the liberty and power of popular sentiment which, as
Joyce Waring observed^ had characterised the movement thus far. (44)
In terms of the relationship which was developing between
the Torch and the United Farty. the Torch would become dependent
on the United Farty for strategic leadership: as Evander Murray
pointed out in a bitter letter to the Star on 24th November, 1951,
the United Farty's failures of leadership would become the
Torch*s weaknesses, (45)
The Torch leadership recognised these contradictions. They
could not afford to split the forces of the Opposition (46)
and so could have no candidates or real influence in a general / c? D
election. (47) T(iere was no real unity in the evolving Torch/ '( 0
United Tarty excapt a broad solidarity of purpose. Nationarist
propaganda, coupled with the exploitation of areas of mutual
co-operation maintained a semblance of togetherness. But the
position was anomalous, and by early 1952 both groups admitted
that liaison activities had been proceeding for some time (48)
While these negotiations were being pursued, the Torch
continued to work on the periphery of structured polit ics. The
imminent sitting of the 10th Delimitation Commission prompted
 r
the Torch to engage in a widespread voters1 registration
campaign, and intensive research was carried out into the whole
nature and function of delimitation in South Africa. This
represented the last vestiges of the original War Veteran/ United Party
alliance to prevent the Nationalists entrenching themselves
after a favourable hearing at the 1952 delimitation.
The liaison between the opposition white groups before
the 1953 election led to the formation in April, 1952 of the
United Democratic Front formed by the Torch,the Labour Party
and the United "party. From the moment of i ts inception the Front
was subjected to almost intolerable stresses. Speaking on tKe / Q^*-
evening of Strauss1 announcement of the formation of the Frcntm '
^Cane-Berman, discussing the government's plans to circumvent
v
-che Appeal Court said that if the Nationalists persisted in this
policy, the Torch would call a day of protest ' to bring the
country to a virtual standstill*'(49)
This was ready made political ammunition for the Nationalists.
the next day in Parliament Minister Swart asked the United P
d b if B k i h h i b l iyand Labour Farcy if Kane- ertnan spoke with theirzblessing.
The immediate denial tarnished the facade of unity upon which
the Front depended.
KanerBerman1s indiscretion was actually a very natural result
of the predicament in which the Torch found itself. It had long
regarded structured politics as anathema; many of i ts senior
officials had never been members of political parties. For the
situation^b have arisen whereby i t appeared tnat they were compelled
to participate in structured politics was an admission of the
failure of the mass movement they were leading.
42. Star 8th October, 1951
43. Rand Daily Mail 3rd November, 1951
44. Star 19th November, 1951
*
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- I'Di-d 24th November, 1951
46' Zliend 25th August, 1951
47. RancTsaily Mall 21st August, 1951.
(-L1-)
The difficulties which had been encountered from the outset
in defining the relationship between the Torch and the other
opposition political parties were not reconciled for the Torch
by the United Democratic Front. On the contrary, the TorcH
was driven by the pact into anto an acknowledgement that it_did
not justify its sizej scope or claims. In the Front the Torch
was simply a repetition in form and numbers of the other members
of the pact. The sheer inability to shift the Nationalists
by constitutional mass demonstration meant the acceptance that
only unconstitutional mass demonstration or the ballot box
would provide the answer. And the ballot box was really the
concern of people who participate in the day-to-day business
of structured politics.
Some kind of a division of labour was naturally possible
with the Front. The Torch took the lead in organising the
demonstrations against the High Court o$ Parliament Bill(51)
Likewise the number of workers the Torch had at its disposal
was of great use to the pact in conducting voters'registrations
and canvassing.
But tensions were greater than these mere semblances of
unity, and matters deteriorated gravely over the issue of the
Natal Stand. In June 1952 a public meeting was held in Durban
at which opinions over the constitutional crisis were aired.
Secession was a topic lying below the surface of most of
the activity, and 'Gillie1 Ford, the Natal Leader of the Torch
brought it out into the open through an oft-quoted catechism
with the crowd of about 35 000:
Will you remain in a Sroederbond republic if it is declared
on the pretext of the Volkswll ? -' NoJ
Are your prepared to take the consequence if Natal ts forced
to stand on her own? - Yes! (52)
Natal split over the issue, the structured political groups
rejecting the idea whereas the Defenders of the Constitution
and the Natal Torch accepted the principle. The National
Executive of the Torch attempted to steer a middle course,
finally repudiating some of 'fiillie1 Ford's more extreme / Q fa
statements and provoking a split in the Natal Torch (53)
At the centre of the crisis lay the same divisions which
had paralysed the Torch at the inception of the movement.
Ford evidently believed that there was something unprincipled
in the way the United Party refused to state 'clearly and honestly
...its policies.1 (54) After all, he represented the more
militant,less constitutionally inhibited-side of the ex-servicemen's
movement. He was prepared to sacrifice means for ends, and
consequently estranged himself from the majority, who saw the
means as ends in themselves. Between these two factions the gap
widened, and it was only the immensity of the problems facing
the Opposition in South African politics which maintained
the semblance of unity in the pact. Defeat in the 1953 election
shattered utterly the facade.
48. Natal Daiiy News 25th January,. 1951. ~ "
49. Rand Daily Kail 17th April, 1952
50. Assembly jabates Vol 78 Cols. 3879 Qt seq.
51. For details of meetings vide passim the Natal Press 19th-22nd May,195;
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 •-£* star 7th June, 1952.
52. Natal Mercury 7th June 1952
53. For details vide Nicholls, G.H. South Africa in My Time London 1961
pp. 443-454
54. Natal Mercury 13th September, 1952.
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It is not necessary to examine in .iny detail the 1953 election
to account for the failure of the United Democratic Front. Such
a study would only show why the opoosition political parties
performed even less successfully than in 1948. The Torch was not s
really an issue in the ele*ction/At best it rendered the opposition
machine more effective as a result of its campaigns for voter
registration,; and its participation in electoral activities (55)
But the election was fought by political parties on the territory
which was familiar to them, and the rdie of the Torch in the Front
from the beginning of 1953 was, as Gwendolen Carter has pointed
out. that of 'a partner, a very junior partner as far as
influence was concerned.'(56)
Tho manifesto issued at the time of the Torch's inception
indicated that the movement would dissolve within 100 hours
of the achievement of its objectives.(57) Jhe collapse of the
Front with the results of the 1953 election brought to a head
the problem of dissolution. Theoretically the Torch should have
been strengthened in its resolution to remove the Nationalists.
However, the recognition that a general election had failed to dislodge
the government cast doubt upon the method and function of
(jthe Torch as a political movement.
The second National Congress of the Torch in June 1953
determined by a narrow majority that the Torch would not
. disband. Its effective presence in South African politics ceased
utterly, and several of its national leaders joined the new political
parties which proliferated after the election.
The 1953 election results shattered the compromise of white
opposition politics in South Africa. The emergence of the Union
Federal Party and the Liberal Party, and the shift to the Left
In the Natal Labour Party expresses the dissatisfaction felt by
opposition politicians with the concept of a single unified opposition.
There was no attempt to find a place for a political pressure
group which refused co become a political party. This was a tacit
acknowledgement thai: the Torch had been functionally out of place
in the south/African opposition.
Some observations about the Torch Commando and white opposition
politics in oouth Africa are perhaps apposite:
The establishment of the Front had formalised an evolving
Qjpolitical pattern in South Africa: the tendency for ooposition _ I
forces to concentrate together. This unification of Oppositions '/70*
determined that there would be a growing competitiveness within |
the political structure: in the 1953 election any seat not won by j
the Front would be gained by their opponents (there were only j
five independent candidates) and vice versa. f
The Torch1s participation in the Front formaLised a relationship j
which was strategically dysfunctional to it as a movement. The j
Torch regarded itself as a supra political group. Yet the site it j
chose for the political confrontation in 1953 was a parliamentary j
election. As a mass movement, Its resources were far more effective
outside the constitutional political arena. Inasmuch as it is a
political strategy to chose the site of a political encounter in
terms of one's capacities, the '• Torch did itself no service by
meeting their enemy on ground which was unfamiliar. This was not j
wholly their own shortcoming. It is a feature of white opposition
55. Heard, K.A. General Elections in South Africa 1943-70 London 197A
pp. 51-3 ""
56. Carter, G.M. op. cit. p. 325.
57. Rand Daily Malt TTth May, 1951
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politics of this period that the Nationalists dominate by seizing
control of the initiative. Customarily they achiswa this by
driving their Opposition on to the defensive over policies or
absence of them. In the case of the Torch, their attitude to
the inclusion of Coloured exwservicemen in their ranks was subjected
to scrutiny. In the Westminster system it is usually the
prerogative of the Opposition to oppose, and to oblige the^
government to defend its policies. By reversing this, the
Nationalists condemned their opposition to the exposure and
risks of government without the commensurate advantage of power.
Initially the Torch controlled the initiative, for the
infectious enthusiasm which characterised the early stages of
the war veterans' movement was something wholly unfamiliar
to the Nationalists. 3ut as the Torch lost its raison d'etre
through not being permitted to try and fprce the government
into resignation in 1951, their strategies were ineffectually
directed, doubtless tha Nationalists would have resisted
a call for resignation, but at least the Torch would have
been in a position where the means at their disposal would
have had some correlation with the ends they had in mind.
Instead, they were forced onto, the defensive just as the
initial euphoria of their mass demonstrations wore off. It then
became necessary to show their supporters some results. This
was never possible because there had been no consideration
of what strategies hoped to achieve.
Unwilling to be revolutionary, because that would be a
denial of the aims of the movement, the Torch found itself
compelled to express itself through the ballot box - which was
a denial of the nature of the movement. Consequently it became
nothing. It was a bubble which burst over the South African political
scene. It vanished almost as suddenly as it emerged, and
remarkably few South Africans know, care or remember anything
about it.
Michael Fridjhon.
18th February, 1976.
